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We investigate evolutionary dynamics of altruism with long-range interaction on a cycle. The
interaction between individuals is described by a simplified version of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD)
game in which the payoffs are parameterized by c, the cost of a cooperative action. In our model,
the probabilities of the game interaction and competition decay algebraically with rAB , the distance
between two players A and B, but with different exponents: That is, the probability to play the PD
game is proportional to r−αAB . If player A is chosen for death, on the other hand, the probability for B
to occupy the empty site is proportional to r−βAB . In a limiting case of β →∞, where the competition
for an empty site occurs between its nearest neighbors only, we analytically find the condition for
the proliferation of altruism in terms of cth, a threshold of c below which altruism prevails. For
finite β, we conjecture a formula for cth as a function of α and β. We also propose a numerical
method to locate cth, according to which we observe excellent agreement with the conjecture even
when the selection strength is of considerable magnitude.
I. INTRODUCTION
As Charles Darwin remarked in On the Origin of
Species, “Natural selection will never produce in a be-
ing anything injurious to itself, for natural selection acts
solely by and for the good of each.” The existence of
altruism is seemingly at odds with this statement, as far
as altruists are defined as those who benefit others at
the cost to themselves. For this reason, there have been
extensive studies to explain the evolution of altruism.
The explanations can be categorized (arguably) into five
rules, i.e., direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, spatial
reciprocity, kin selection, and group selection [1, 2]. An
essential common factor in these mechanisms is the as-
sortment of individuals carrying the cooperative pheno-
type [3, 4]. Let us consider a population of defectors. If
there emerges a group within which the members cooper-
ate themselves, its size will increase because the members
earn higher fitness than the population average. Further-
more, if the assortment can be maintained while the size
of the group grows, the whole population will become co-
operative. On the other hand, if the assortment breaks,
making every individual interact with every other, co-
operators will disappear because they earn less than the
population average by construction.
Considering that the defectors always win in the
mean-field regime, one may expect that spatial reci-
procity becomes weaker as the dimensionality of the
space d increases. The logic goes as follows: In a popu-
lation of size N , the average chemical distance between
a pair of individuals behaves as ∼ N1/d and thus de-
creases dramatically as d grows. Hence, it is reason-
able to expect a relatively homogeneous state in a high-
dimensional structure. In many statistical-physical mod-
els, the mean-field theory becomes exact as d exceeds a
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certain value dc[5]. Another way to look at the crossover
between a low-dimensional spin system and the mean-
field limit is to consider long-range interactions on a one-
dimensional (1D) lattice structure [6]. For example, when
the interaction strength decays as r−1−σ between a pair
of 1D Ising spins with distance r, the spins show the
mean-field-like critical behaviors for 0 < σ ≤ 1/2 as
those with short range interactions in high dimensions
d > dc = 4 do. For 1/2 ≤ σ ≤ 1, 1D Ising spin system
shows the order-disorder transitions at finite tempera-
tures but its critical behaviors are different from mean-
field transition. For σ > 1, the interactions become short-
ranged effectively and they behave as the 1D spins with
finite-range interactions.
The story becomes more complicated when it comes
to evolutionary games: Let us consider the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) game with the death-birth (DB) repro-
duction process in the weak selection limit. It has a
certain population structure, and the game is played be-
tween players at one step away. On regular structures,
the condition for cooperation turns out to be determined
by the number of nearest neighbors regardless of d [7] (see
also Ref. 8 for more general results). Furthermore, spatial
reciprocity breaks down for any population structures if
we employ the birth-death (BD) process instead. What
is the difference between the DB and BD processes? The
point is that we actually have another kind of interac-
tion, that is, competition for reproduction. For social
behavior to evolve, these two should have different length
scales [4]. Even if the game interaction shares the same
underlying structure with competition for reproduction,
the DB process naturally separates the scales because the
competition for reproduction effectively occurs between
players at two steps away.
In this paper, we wish to investigate the roles of these
two length scales explicitly by considering the PD game
on a cycle with long-range interactions, whose dynamics
is governed by the DB process. The game is parameter-
ized by the cost of cooperation, denoted by c. We are
interested in its threshold, cth, above which cooperators
ar
X
iv
:1
81
2.
10
63
9v
1 
 [q
-b
io.
PE
]  
27
 D
ec
 20
18
2are outnumbered by defectors in the infinite population
with zero mutation limit. The length scale of the game
interaction is determined by an exponent α, so that the
game result between two individuals at distance r has a
weighting factor of r−α. On the other hand, the length
scale of competition for reproduction is determined by
another exponent β, so the probability for an individual
to occupy an empty site at distance r decays algebraically
as r−β . Our first main result is to derive cth for β →∞,
where only the nearest neighbors compete for reproduc-
tion. Then, we consider the case of α = β, where an
analytic result for cth is available in the weak-selection
limit [8]. Based on these two special cases, we conjecture
a general form of cth(α, β). It agrees well with numerical
results.
This work is organized as follows: In the next section,
we give a detailed description of our model. In Sec. III,
we present cth as a function of α in case of β → ∞ and
review the exact cth when α = β in the weak-selection
limit. Based on these two results, we conjecture cth for
general α and β. Section IV compares this conjecture
with Monte Carlo data. The conjectured threshold nicely
matches with our numerical calculation, and this holds
even if the selection strength increases. We discuss this
finding and conclude this work in Sec. V.
II. MODEL
The population structure is a cycle, i.e., a 1D lattice
with the periodic boundary condition. For the sake of
convenience, the total number of sites is assumed to be
an add number in this section and we set N ≡ 2n + 1.
Of course, it will be irrelevant whether N is even or odd
if we deal with a sufficiently large system. Every site i
is occupied by a player, who is also denoted by i = −n,
−n+ 1, . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . , n − 1, n, and each player i can
choose an action si between cooperation C and defection
D. The PD game is formulated as the donation game,
where a cooperator benefits the co-player by an amount
of b > 0 with paying cost c ∈ (0, b). The payoff matrix pi
is thus defined as
C D
C
D
(
b− c − c
b 0
)
.
(1)
Without loss of generality, we will set b = 1 throughout
this work. The expected payoff of player i per game is
given by the following weighted sum,
Πi =
∑
j 6=i
r−α
ij
2ζn(α)
pisisj=¯
1
2ζn(α)
∑
j 6=i
pisisj
rα
ij
(2)
where ζn(α) ≡
∑n
k=1 k
−α is the incomplete Riemann zeta
function and r−α
ij
/2ζn(α) is the probability that player i
play a game with player j where r
ij
is the distance be-
tween them. On a cycle, r
ij
is given by the minimum of
|i − j|, |i − j + N |, and |i − j − N |. We consider the
expected payoff per game (rather than the total payoff,∑
j 6=i r
−α
ij
pisisj ) to make the average payoff independent
of the population size. This normalized payoff is also
better to compare two systems with different α fairly.
The systems with smaller α would show effectively more
strong selections without the normalization.
Fig. 1(a) illustrates the way to calculate payoff Π0 of
player 0 for α = 2 and n = 3. Player 0 at the top plays
the PD game with every other in the population, k = ±3,
±2, and k = ±1. From Eq. (1), we see that pi0k is −c
for k = −2,−1 and 1 and b − c for k = −3, 3, and 2.
Π0 is the weighted sum of these values with the wighting
factors, |k|
−2
2ζ3(2)
where 2ζ3(2) = 2
[
1/12 + 1/22 + 1/32
]
=
98
36 . Since
|k|−2
2ζ3(2)
is 3698 for n = ±1, 998 for n = ±2, and
4
98 for n = ±3, Π0 is given by pi0 = 1798b − c. We can
calculate the payoffs of the other players similarly. They
are Π−3 = 4998b − c, Π−2 = 5898b, Π−1 = 5398b, Π1 = 8598b,
Π2 =
54
98b− c, Π3 = 4998b− c.
Player i’s fitness is given by the exponential form of
the payoff,
fi = e
ωΠi , (3)
where the selection strength ω represents how strongly
the fitness depends on the payoff. Exponential fitness of
Eq. (3) becomes the usual linear fitness of 1 + ωΠi in
the weak selection limit. It has an advantage over lin-
ear fitness in the strong selection limit. We can interpret
the exponential fitness as fecundity directly even when
the payoff is negative. Furthermore, DB dynamics is in-
variant under the addition of a constant to all elements
in the pay off matrix which certainly preserve the Nash
equilibrium.
We employ a long-range version of the DB process as
a model of reproduction. The first step is to choose a
death site k randomly, irrespective of fitness, and make
it empty. The probability to choose a particular site k
is therefore inversely proportional to N . The difference
from the usual DB process for the nearest-neighbor com-
petition is that any player i in the population can produce
an offspring at the empty site. For given k, the condi-
tional probability pik that player i’s offspring takes over
the site k is proportional to the player’s fitness fi but
decreases as r−βik where rik is the distance between them.
In other words, pik is given by
pik =
1
Zk
eωΠi
rβik
, (4)
where Zk ≡
∑
i6=k e
ωΠi × r−βik is a normalization factor.
Note that the player at the death site k cannot leave an
offspring. In particular, sk will become C with probabil-
ity
P 0sk→C =
1
Zk
∑
i6=k
eωΠi
rβik
δsi,C , (5)
where δx,y is the Kronecker delta. To remove trivial
absorbing states where every player takes the same ac-
tion, we introduce a small mutation probability µ. When
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Schematic representation of an exam-
ple of the model (α = β = 2, n = 3). (a) Payoff of the player 0.
Player 0 plays the PD game of Eq. (1) with player k 6= 0 pro-
ducing pi0k = b − c for k = −3, 2, and 3 and pi0k = −c for
k = −2,−1 and 1. Π0 is the weighted sum of these values
with the weighting factors, |k|
−2
2ζ3(2)
. Weighting factors are 36
98
for n = ±1, 9
98
for n = ±2, and 4
98
for n = ±3, and Payoff of
the player 0 is Π0 =
17
98
b − c. Payoff Πk of player k 6= 0 can
be obtained similarly; Π−3 = 4998 b− c, Π−2 = 5898 b, Π−1 = 5398 b,
Π1 =
85
98
b, Π2 =
54
98
b − c, Π3 = 4998 b − c. (b) Competition for
reproduction. When a player, say, i = 0, is chosen for death,
the other players k 6= 0 compete to produce their offspring
at this empty site. Player k’s winning probability is propor-
tional to its fitness fk = e
ωΠk and inverse square distance
|k|−2. Note that 1/Z0 is to normalize the total sum of proba-
bilities. The winner’s offspring inherits the winner’s strategy
with probability (1− µ) or the opposite one with µ 1.
player i reproduces its offspring at the site k, sk becomes
si with probability 1− µ and by the opposite of si with
probability µ. If we combine the DB process and muta-
tion together, the actual probability that sk becomes C
- -2 1 0 1 2 3... ...
(a) C C C D D D... ...
(b) C C C C D D... ...
(c) C C D D D D... ...
FIG. 2. (Color online) Domain-wall dynamics in case of the
nearest-neighbor competition (β →∞). (a) Initial configura-
tion in which two domains meet at a wall between the sites
k = 0 and 1. The competition for reproduction occurs be-
tween the players at these sites. (b) If k = 1 is made empty
and occupied by an offspring of the player at k = 0, the do-
main wall moves right. (c) On the contrary, the domain wall
moves left if k = 0 is made empty and taken over by an off-
spring of the player at k = 1.
is given by
Psk→C = (1− µ)P 0sk→C + µ
(
1− P 0sk→C
)
. (6)
It is straightforward to see that the complementary event
sk → D occurs with probability 1− Psk→C .
We demonstrate the reproduction process in Fig. 1(b)
for β = 2 and n = 3. When a player, say, i = 0,
is chosen for death, the other players k 6= 0 compete
to produce their offspring at this empty site. Player
k’s winning probability is given by 1|k|2 Z0 e
ωΠk with Πk
given in the caption of (a). Here Z0 = e
ωΠ1 + eωΠ−1 +
1
4
[
eωΠ2 + eωΠ−2
]
+ 19
[
eωΠ3 + eωΠ−3
]
so that the normal-
ization factor 1/Z0 makes the total sum of probabilities
be 1. The winner’s offspring inherits the winner’s strat-
egy with probability (1 − µ) or the opposite one with
µ 1.
III. ANALYSIS
We begin by considering how the threshold cost
cth(α, β) behaves in special cases. The first one is the
case with the nearest-neighbor competition, represented
by β →∞. The second one is when α = β, and cth(α, α)
in the weak-selection limit is readily obtained by applying
the result of Ref. 8.
A. Nearest-neighbor competition (β →∞)
If β →∞, only the nearest neighbors of the death site
will compete for reproduction. Let us define a domain as
a set of consecutive sites with the same action, bounded
by sites with the opposite action. When a death site k
is picked up inside a domain, therefore, the action of its
neighbors must be the same as sk. If µ is negligibly small,
we can say that the configuration {si} will not change. It
implies that the system shows dynamics only at domain
4boundaries. Let us assume that the system is divided
into two equally large domains so that
si =
{
C for i = 0,−1,−2, . . . ,−n
D for i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
(7)
as shown in Fig. 2(a). Assume that k = 1 is chosen as
for death. Only its neighboring players k = 0 and k = 2
compete to take over the empty site, and the domain wall
will move right if the offspring of player i = 0 wins. The
payoffs Π0 and Π2 are calculated as
Π0 =
1
2ζn(α)
∑
j 6=0
pis0sj
rα0j
=
1
2ζn(α)
n∑
r=1
(
1− c
rα
+
−c
rα
)
=
¯
1
2
− c, (8)
Π2 =
1
2ζn(α)
∑
j 6=2
pis2sj
rα2j
=
1
2ζn(α)
n∑
r=2
1
rα
=
¯
1
2
− 1
2ζn(α)
, (9)
and the probability that the wall moves right is given by
P 0s1→C =
eωΠ0
eωΠ0 + eωΠ2
. (10)
Similarly, we can calculate the probability that the wall
moves left, P 0s0→D, from Π−1 and Π1. The population
will become cooperative when P 0s1→C > P
0
s0→D. If N 
1, this inequality reduces to
c <
1
2ζn(α)
(11)
and we have cth(α,∞) = 1/2ζn(α).
B. Analytic solution of α = β
If the game interaction and competition share the
same population structure, strategies selected by the
network reciprocity can be obtained on any population
structure in the weak-selection limit of ω → 0 using co-
alescent theory [8]. When we denote the expected coa-
lescence time [9] from the two ends of an n-step random
walk by τn, cooperation is favored when c is smaller than
cth =
τ3 − τ1
τ2
(12)
in the weak-selection limit. In a weighted undirected
graph, if site i is connected to j by an edge, the edge
has a weight wij = wji. The weighted degree of site i is
the sum of its edge weights: wi ≡
∑
j wij . The probabil-
ity for a random walker to transit from i to j is denoted
by pij ≡ wij/wi. A useful quantity is the Simpson degree
κi =
(∑
j p
2
ij
)−1
, a generalization of the topological de-
gree. For a regular graph, the site index i is unnecessary
since every vertex has the same Simpson degree ki = k.
Equation (12) is then rewritten as
cth =
N/κ− 2
N − 2 . (13)
In our case, noting that wij ∝ r−αij for i 6= j and wii =
0, we find the threshold as a combination of the zeta
functions [10],
cth(α, α) =
ζn(2α)
2 [ζn (α)]
2 , (14)
where we have taken into account N  1 in the sense of
the ωN -limit [11].
C. Conjecture for cth(α, β)
To recap, we have two predictions: First, if β → ∞
and N  1, the threshold cost is predicted to be
cth(α,∞) = 1
2ζn(α)
, (15)
so that ζn(α) can be interpreted as the effective number
of neighbors to play the game with on one side of the
focal player. Second, when α = β, the threshold cost cth
has been derived as
cth(α, α) =
ζn(α+ α)
2ζn(α)ζn(α)
(16)
for ω → 0. To incorporate Eqs. (15) and (16), we conjec-
ture a connection formula cth(α, β) as follows:
cth(α, β) =
ζn(α+ β)
2ζn(α)ζn(β)
. (17)
In particular, for α→∞, the conjecture predicts
cth(∞, β) = 1
2ζn(β)
. (18)
IV. NUMERICAL CALCULATION
For Monte Carlo simulation, we construct a cycle of
size N with a player at each site. Initial si’s are ran-
domly chosen between C and D equally probably. Then,
according to the DB process, we randomly select a player
(say, k) for death and choose another player i with prob-
ability pik in Eq. (4). One Monte Carlo step consists of
N trials to update the configuration {si}. In addition,
we introduce mutation with small probability µ  1 so
that the system has a unique stationary distribution over
configurations {si}. The quantity of interest is coopera-
tor abundance x
C
, the average frequency of cooperators
in the steady state. For each data point in a sample, we
run the Monte Carlo simulation for 6× 103 Monte Carlo
steps, and the time average of x
C
is taken for the last 102
Monte Carlo steps, at which the simulation has already
reached a steady state. The total number of samples
amounts to 4× 103.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Threshold estimation in case of
nearest-neighbor competition (β → ∞). The parameters for
Monte Carlo simulation are the total number of sitesN = 128,
selection strength ω = 0.02, and mutation rate µ = 10−3. (a)
Cooperator abundance xC as a function of c for each different
α. The vertical dotted line means c = 1/2, and the horizontal
shaded area represents 0.495 ± 0.001, the error-bar range of
xC (c = 1/2) for α→∞. (b) The error-bars show [cmin, cmax]
for different values of α. The solid line depicts our analytic
threshold in Eq. (15) for N = 128, and the dotted line shows
the limit of N →∞.
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Threshold estimation for α = β. The
simulation parameters are the same as in Fig. 3. (a) Coop-
erator abundance xC as a function of c for each different α.
The vertical dotted line means c = 1/2, and the horizontal
shaded area represents 0.495 ± 0.001, the error-bar range of
xC (c = 1/2) for α→∞. (b) The error-bars show [cmin, cmax]
for different values of α. The solid line depicts our analytic
threshold in Eq. (16) for N = 128, and the dotted line shows
the limit of N →∞.
A. Weak selection (w = 0.02)
Noting that most of the analytic results have been
obtained in the weak-selection limit, we have to check
this limit first and proceed to stronger selection strengths
thereafter. Let us begin by setting β → ∞. If α also
goes to infinity, the threshold at which x
C
(cth) = 1/2
is analytically given as cth(∞,∞) = 1/2 in the ωN -
limit [11]. However, this limit cannot be taken exactly in
the Monte Carlo simulation, and µ cannot be infinites-
imally small either. For c = 1/2, we actually observe
x
C
= 0.495 ± 0.001. We regard this value as a reference
point to estimate cth(α,∞), assuming that it takes into
account all the corrections due to the difference from the
ωN -limit as well as the finiteness of µ. The procedure to
estimate cth(α,∞) now goes as follows: For given α, we
calculate x
C
as a function of c, together with the standard
error from statistically independent samples. As a lower
bound of cth(α,∞), we pick up cmin, defined as c below
which all the error bars of x
C
(c) lie above 0.495± 0.001.
α=∞
(a)
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1 / [2ζ64(β)]
Numerical
FIG. 5. (Color online) Threshold estimation for α =∞. The
simulation parameters are the same as in Fig. 3. (a) Coop-
erator abundance xC as a function of c for each different β.
The vertical dotted line means c = 1/2, and the horizontal
shaded area represents 0.495 ± 0.001, the error-bar range of
xC (c = 1/2) for β →∞. (b) The error-bars show [cmin, cmax]
for different values of β. The solid line depicts our conjec-
tured threshold in Eq. (18) for N = 128, and the dotted line
shows the limit of N →∞.
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cth0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
ζ(3β) / [2ζ(2β) ζ(β)]
ζ64(3β) / [2ζ64(2β) ζ64(β)]
1 / [2ζ64(β)]
Numerical
FIG. 6. (Color online) Threshold estimation for α = 2β.
The simulation parameters are the same as in Fig. 3. (a)
Cooperator abundance xC as a function of c for each different
β. The vertical dotted line means c = 1/2, and the horizontal
shaded area represents 0.495 ± 0.001, the error-bar range of
xC (c = 1/2) for β →∞. (b) The error-bars show [cmin, cmax]
for different values of β. The solid line depicts our conjectured
threshold in Eq. (17) for N = 128, and the dotted line shows
the limit of N → ∞. For comparison, we have also plotted
1/[2ζ64(β)] as in Fig. 5(b), which deviates from the numerical
data.
Likewise, the upper bound of cth(α,∞) is given by cmax,
defined as c above which all the error bars of x
C
(c) lie
below 0.495 ± 0.001 [Fig. 3(a)]. The numerical estimate
of cth(α,∞) is thus represented by an interval [cmin, cmax]
as shown in Fig. 3(b). The agreement with Eq. (15) is
compelling. The above procedure can be applied to the
case of α = β as well [Fig. 4(a)]. Here, the estimation is
more difficult because the slope of x
C
becomes steeper as
α decreases. Nevertheless, Fig. 4(b) shows that our esti-
mates are consistent with the analytic solution [Eq. (16)].
Let us move on to check whether the conjecture of
Eq. (17) correctly predicts the threshold behavior even
when no analytic proof is available. One specific exam-
ple that we can test is an extreme case of α→∞, where
the conjecture reduces to Eq. (18). Comparing Fig. 5(a)
with Fig. 3(a), we see that α and β do not play the same
role in determining the cooperator abundance. Never-
theless, Fig. 5(b) substantiates the conjectured symme-
try between α and β in the threshold behavior. To make
both α and β finite yet unequal, we consider another
6β=∞
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0
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α=2β
α=β
FIG. 7. (Color online) Threshold estimation for w = 1. The
other simulation parameters are the same as in Fig. 3. (a)
Cooperator abundance xC as a function of c for each different
α, while β → ∞. The vertical dotted line means c = 1/2,
and the horizontal shaded area represents 0.2923±0.0045, the
error-bar range of xC (c = 1/2) for α→∞. (b) The error-bars
show [cmin, cmax] for different values of β. The lines depict our
conjectured thresholds in Eq. (17).
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α=β
FIG. 8. (Color online) Threshold estimation for w = 5. The
other simulation parameters are the same as in Fig. 3. (a)
Cooperator abundance xC as a function of c for each different
α = β. The vertical dotted line means c = 1/2, and the
horizontal shaded area represents 0.0280± 0.0007, the error-
bar range of xC (c = 1/2) for α → ∞. Note the logarithmic
scale on the vertical axis. (b) The error-bars show [cmin, cmax]
for different values of β. The lines depict our conjectured
thresholds in Eq. (17).
case of α = 2β [Fig. 6(a)]. Again, our numerical results
support the conjecture in Eq. (17). The overall behav-
ior might look similar to the previous case of α = ∞,
but a closer look shows that our numerical estimates are
sharp enough to distinguish the difference between them
[Fig. 6(b)].
B. Stronger selection (w = 1 and w = 5)
The conjectured formula [Eq. (17)] works even beyond
the weak-selection limit. Our numerical estimation pro-
cedure hinges on the fact that we can still take c = 1/2
as the threshold in a double limit of α→∞ and β →∞
for arbitrary selection strength [11]. In this limit, our nu-
merical calculation gives xc = 0.2923±0.0045 at c = 1/2,
provided that we have set w = 1 [Fig. 7(a)]. As we have
done above, we will take this value as a reference point
to locate the threshold in other combinations of α and
β for which one can suitably define an extrapolation to
α → ∞ and β → ∞: Let us take a look at the results
shown in Fig. 7(b). Here, we demonstrate three cases,
α = ∞, α = 2β, and α = β. Note that the limit can
be approached by taking β → ∞ for all these cases, so
that the abundance levels may be compared with the ref-
erence value in the double limit. Although none of the
cases have been solved analytically, the threshold behav-
ior is indeed captured by Eq. (17) with high precision.
As w increases, the quality of fit deteriorates, how-
ever. For w = 5, for example, the reference value is
lowered to xc = 0.0280 ± 0.0007 [Fig. 8(a)]. It is a
tiny value, and the slope of x
C
(c) is steep, which makes
the estimate more challenging than the previous weaker-
selection cases. It is not surprising that deviations from
the conjecture become visible [Fig. 8(b)], but the overall
agreement is still remarkable.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
To summarize, we have studied the PD game on a
cycle, where the probabilities for two players at distance
r to play the game and to compete for reproduction de-
cay algebraically as r−α and r−β , respectively. When
the benefit of cooperation is fixed as unity, there exists a
threshold cost cth(α, β) below which the population be-
comes cooperative. Based on analytically tractable cases
[Eqs. (15) and (16)], we have conjectured its functional
form as given in Eq. (17). The apparent symmetry be-
tween α and β in Eq. (17) is nontrivial as one sees that
Fig. 3(a) clearly differs from 5(a). Although we are un-
able to prove our conjecture at the moment, the striking
agreement with numerical results suggests that the exact
result of c(α, α) can be generalized in a simple form, at
least in this particular long-ranged interaction model on
a cycle.
The threshold costs in our model do not seem to de-
pend on the selection strength ω strongly. For the nearest
neighbor competitions (β → ∞), this independence can
be understood easily since the threshold cost is obtained
from the domain boundary dynamics as discussed in III
A. For finite β, our conjecture relies on the analytic solu-
tion of weak selection limit. However, the threshold costs
are almost independent of selection strength up to ω ≈ 5.
Further studies on the robustness of the weak selection
limit as well as the threshold costs for general population
structures are needed.
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